The hang-up with the Google Phone

Have you ever noticed that the next great über-device is always something ahead that people want, but rarely -- if ever -- something in front of them that they have? It almost doesn't matter what that device is, just as long as the rumor mill is so overhyped and over-amped that device-tech followers can't focus on anything else. It's almost as if the device is sustained by its lack of existence, by its mythology rather than its technology. As long as it's "out there," rather than right here, it becomes the single focal point for anyone who lusts after it, and fans literally count the days until it hits the shelves and changes their lives forever. "Forever," in this case, being about 38 minutes, until the rumor mill cranks back up again.

It's like a great party, where reality doesn't seem to matter much as long as everyone's having a good time.

And almost three years after Apple announced the iPhone and kicked off a new era in über-device worship, Google's taking a crack at the iPhone killer crown with its rumored upcoming handset, the Nexus One. Is it or is it not an iPhone killer? Should we even care? And while we're at it can we please retire the phrase "something-something-killer?" It's getting old.

A strange shift in direction

I'll apologize now for not having gotten it in the beginning. I thought Google's strategy was to quarterback the Open Handset Alliance, to get a broad-based consortium of handset vendors, carriers, and software developers together to redefine how the typical mobile device is designed, coded, and sold. I assumed Google's stewardship was the first significant effort to make modern mobile platforms open and less expensive. I felt this way right up until the moment that the near-mythical Nexus One/Google Phone/Latest Jesus Device emerged from the shadows, and all but confirmed Google's intention to go for Apple's and RIM's respective jugulars.

I do understand why Google would want to have its own branded phone. No one, after all, enjoys letting someone else get all the accolades -- and the Android project is designed from the outset to let the handset vendors and carriers control the shots, and ultimately brand themselves more closely to end-users than Google can.

There's a reason why Apple and Research In Motion own both the hardware and OS for their respective platforms: They can define every aspect of the end-user experience without giving anything away to anyone else. If closed environments are the domain of the control freaks among us, then projects designed to be more open often leave quarterbacks like Google forgotten while everyone else celebrates in the end zone. Sure they designed, initiated and controlled the play, but they were way on the other end of the field when points were scored.

Google, from where it sits, is tired of letting Motorola, LG, Samsung, et al, own the stage and drink in the fans' adulation. The company hopes that by jumping across the software/hardware divide, its upcoming self-branded phone might allow it to capture some marketing mojo.

More specifically, Google also wants absolute control over how it connects services to advertisements to audiences. In its traditionally delivered Web services world, it doesn't answer to handset vendors who customize their own devices for their own purposes. While it has to ensure its services play nice with Internet Explorer and Firefox, no other players stand between it and its advertising targets -- namely, us. Its Chrome browser and Chrome OS project are designed to strengthen that connection still further, while enabling it to more closely control the technologies that drive its ever-growing spigot of ad-based revenue. The same thinking now applies on the mobile side.

From friend to foe

All this brings no comfort to LG, Motorola, Samsung, Sony Ericsson, and the other handset vendors who, as part of the Open Handset Alliance, either are or will be leveraging Android in their own products. Their partner since day one has now emerged as a competitor. And it's not just any company -- it's the 800-pound gorilla of every market it touches.

For Motorola, the last thing it needs after delivering its first serious hit following years of wandering in the smartphone desert, is the vendor equivalent of the Borg now breathing down its neck. I wonder if the handset vendors' respective decisions to join the Alliance and place their bets behind Android would have been any different had they known back then that Google would someday try to move into their territory. I also wonder if this opens the door for Alliance members to start hedging their bets elsewhere, in case Google uses this initial device as the foundation for a more aggressive push into mobile hardware.

I'm probably being just slightly too hard on Google. As a publicly traded company, it has every right to competitively pursue whatever avenues it sees fit to drive revenues, profits, and ultimately, shareholder value. Its earlier efforts to break a carrier-controlled model it has long characterized as unfairly expensive, complex, and punitive to consumers (remember its position on 700 MHz spectrum?) highlight a very real need to change the way consumers and businesses acquire, use, and pay for mobility. Its ability to efficiently generate advertising-based revenue from online activity should evolve nicely from its roots on the desktop to the rapidly expanding mobile environment. Its very future depends on it, frankly, as conventional PC growth flattens and mobile take-up explodes.

In short, Google has no choice but to be aggressive in everything it does in the wireless space. And if that means becoming a hardware vendor, too (well, through its OEM proxy, HTC), then that's what it intends to do to make it happen. Along the way, though, it risks alienating partners it worked years to get to this point. It also risks derailing Android's momentum just before it truly breaks into the mainstream as a credible alternative to the iPhone and BlackBerry.

The fans will doubtless get their new phone before long (look for an official announcement during CES). But once the fever of a hot new device wears off, Google may find itself dealing with the longer-term implications of ticking off the very partners it needs to ensure the new platform's ultimate success. No one ever said the handset business was easy. Google's about to learn this first-hand.

Carmi Levy is a Canadian-based independent technology analyst and journalist still trying to live down his past life leading help desks and managing projects for large financial services organizations. He comments extensively in a wide range of media, and works closely with clients to help them leverage technology and social media tools and processes to drive their business.